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Fried: The Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Federal Government

HOFSTRA IAW REVIEW
Volume 6, No. 3, Part I

Spring 1978

THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
BernardJ. Fried*
In 1970, Congress entered into the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (the Agreement) on behalf of the federal government and
the District of Columbia.1 At that time the Agreement had been
enacted by twenty-eight states 2 and since then has been entered
into by all but four states. 3 Briefly stated, the Agreement provides
* B.S.,

1962, Alfred University; J.D., 1965, Brooklyn Law School; Fulbright

Scholar (Korea), 1970-1972. The author is Chief of the Criminal Division of the
United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. As Chief of the
Appeals Division of that Office, he was on the Government's Brief in United States
v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 76-1596), in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of
the United States Department of Justice.
1. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397
(1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475 (1970).
2. See 116 CONG. REC. 38,840 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
3.

See Amiz. REv. STAT. §§ 31-481 to 31-482 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-

3201 to 43-3208 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1389.8-1398.8 (West Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-60-501 to 24-60-507 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§

54:186 to 54:192 (West 1958); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 2540-2550 (1975); D.C. CODE §§
24-701 to 24-705 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§§

941.45-.50 (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE

§§ 77-501b to 77-516b (1973); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 834-1 to 834-6 (Supp. 1975);
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-5001 to 19-5008 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1003-8-9 (1973); IND. CODE §§ 11-1-7-1 to 11-1-7-7, 35-2.1-2-4 (1971); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 759 A.1-.8 (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. §§ 22-4401 to 22-4408 (1974); KY.
REV. STAT. §§ 440.450-.510 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 1411-1419
(1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1976); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 1
[Vol. 6: 493

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

a mechanism for clearing outstanding detainers 4 and obtaining
speedy trials of persons already incarcerated and serving sentences

in jurisdictions other than those which have lodged the detainers. 5
Under the Agreement, if a prisoner in a party state had a detainer
lodged against him by a second party state, he may file a "written

request" for final disposition; the second state then must try the
prisoner within 180 days of the request.6 Similarly, a prosecutor
may obtain a prisoner incarcerated in a party state by first lodging

a detainer against the prisoner and then presenting a "written request for temporary custody" over him.1 Once such a request is
made, the defendant must be tried within 120 days after arrival in
the requesting state.8 In either case, if the defendant is not tried
within the requisite time or if he is returned to the original jurisdiction without trial, the charges against him must be dismissed
with prejudice. 9
Almost six years after federal participation began, the Court
276 app.,

§§ 1-1 to 1-8 (West 1972); MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.601-.608 (1968);

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.294 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.

(Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.

§§

222.160-.220

§§ 95-3131 to 95-3136 (Supp. 1975)

(sections renumbered in supplement); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-759 to 29-765 (1975);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.620-.640 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 606-A:1 to 606-

A:6 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:159A-1 to 2A:159A-15 (West 1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-20-19 to 41-20-23 (1953); N.Y. ClM. PROC. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney
1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-761 to 15A-767 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-34-01
to 29-34-08 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2963.30-.35 (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1345-1349 (West Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.775-.793
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1431-1438 (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
13-13-1 to 13-13-8 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE §§ 17-11-10 to 17-11-80 (1976); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 23-24A-1 to 23-24A-34 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
40-3901 to 40-3908 (1975); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14 (Vernon Supp.
1966-1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-65-4 to 77-65-11 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, §§ 1501-1537 (1970); VA. CODE § 53-304.1 to 53-304.8 (1974); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.100.010-.100.080 (1977); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-14-1 to 62-14-7 (1977);
WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 976.05-.06 (West 1971 & Supp. 1977); WYO. STAT. §§ 7-408.9 to
7-408.15 (Supp. 1975). 4. The Act does not define "detainer." However, the House and Senate Committee on the Judiciary reports, H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S.
REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4864, 4865, define detainer as "a notification filed with the institution in
which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction."
5.

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, arts. I, III,

IV, 84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprintedin 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4475-76 (1970).
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. art. III(a), 18
Id. art. IV(a), 18
Id. art. IV(c), 18
Id. art. IV(e), 18

U.S.C. app., at 4475.
U.S.C. app., at 4476.
U.S.C. app., at 4476.
U.S.C. app., at 4476.
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. Mauro,10
for the first time in any circuit, that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum" constitutes a "detainer" as contemplated by the
Agreement and that return to state custody without trial violates
the Agreement. The court further held by implication that the writ
is a "written request" by a prosecutor and that the Agreement is
the sole means of exchanging sentenced prisoners between the
United States and a party state. Shortly after Mauro, the question
whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer
under the Agreement arose in other circuits. The First, 12 Fifth, 13
Sixth, 14 and Eighth' 5 Circuits rejected the Mauro determination.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has followed Mauro. 16 The
17
Ninth Circuit presently has a similar issue pending before it.
Moreover, following Mauro, the Second Circuit held in United
States v. Ford'8 that, regardless of whether a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum is a detainer, once a detainer has been lodged
the writ is a "written request for custody' 9 under the Agreement.
Whether the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes either a detainer or a written request for custody are issues of
critical importance to the orderly administration of the federal
criminal justice system. In early October 1977, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Mauro and Ford to resolve these issues. 20 This
10.

544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,

1977) (No. 76-1596).
11.

A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a "federal court order com-

manding the immediate production of a prisoner at a federal trial." Id. at 595 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Such a writ is issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970).
See text accompanying notes 128-130 infra.
12. United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3158 (U.S. Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-206).
13. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, No. 76-6559.
14. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1977).
15. United States v. Frye, No. 77-1495 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1977); United States v.
Harris, No. 77-1516 (8th Cir. Nov. 30, 1977).
16. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977) (en bane).
17. United States v. Adkins, No. 76-3523 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 26, 1976) (sub
judice).
18. 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 77-52) (argued in tandem with Mauro).
19. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52). The court's holding in Ford involved a
definition of Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
20 United States v. Mauro, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596);
United States v. Ford, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
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article will examine the Agreement from the federal viewpoint and
Ford, concluding, finally,
explore the correctness of Mauro 2and
1
incorrect.
is
each
of
that the holding
THE AGREEMENT

The Agreement was first proposed in 1956 by the Council of
State Governments to remedy serious defects that had arisen in the
so-called detainer system.2 2 This unregulated system 23 allowed law
enforcement officials in one state to file a detainer with prison authorities in a second state, advising the authorities that charges
were pending in the first state against a prisoner jailed in the second state and requesting the second state to notify the first when
the inmate's release was imminent. 24 The detainer thus served as a
21. This article will not discuss the following anticipated troublesome problems
which will arise if the Supreme Court sustains either Mauro or Ford: (1) under what
circumstances rights are created by the Agreement, when these rights may be
waived, and what, if any, is the applicable waiver standard, see, e.g., United States v.

Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2937 (1977); United States v.
Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 77-52). A related issue is whether a claim under the Agreement is waived by a
plea of guilty, see, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977)
(district court held plea of guilty waived claim, while court of appeals, without disturbing this holding, affirmed district court on other grounds); (2) whether these decisions should be applied retroactively, see, e.g., Genovese v. United States, No.
76C-1720 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1977), holding that Mauro should not be given retroactive effect. Accord, United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 231 & n.66 (3d Cir. 1977)
(en bane); (3) whether a claimed violation of the Agreement is cognizable in a collateral attack on a federal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), see Edwards v.
United States, 564 F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] claim based on a violation of
[the Agreement] is not within 28 U.S.C. § 2255."); and (4) whether any judicial limitations on the apparent breadth of the Agreement are proper and are consistent with
and will effectuate the Agreement's underlying purposes, see, e.g., United States v.
Chico, 558 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1977) (return of prisoner on same day does not violate
Agreement); United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
931 (1977) (Agreement inapplicable to unsentenced state prisoner). For a discussion
of these problems, see Note, The Effect of the Interstate Agreement upon Federal
PrisonerTransfer, 46 FORDHAi L. REV. 492 (1977).
22. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION,
PROGRAM FOR 1957, at 78-85 (1956), reprinted in ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
SPEEDY TRIAL app. B, at 47 (Tent. Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA STAN-

See also United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 740 n.24 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
grahted,46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
23. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
24. See id. According to the Council of State Governments, "[a] detainer may
be defined as a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the purpose of
insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the detainer."
DARDS].
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"hold" on the prisoner.
This system, however, caused several problems. Once the institution became aware that the inmate was "wanted" by another
state, the inmate usually was denied full participation in rehabilitation and treatment programs. 25 In addition, detainers raised
speedy trial problems. When the Agreement was initially proposed,
a prisoner's demand to be tried pursuant to a detainer on charges
outstanding in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he was incarcerated was of no legal effect, because an inmate could not compel the state in which he was serving a sentence to transfer him to
a state which had lodged a detainer. 26 Likewise, it was practically
impossible for the state which had lodged the detainer to obtain
custody of the inmate prior to the completion of his sentence in the
confining state; the necessary procedures were cumbersome and expensive and thus were seldom invoked. Consequently, this system
was, not surprisingly, unsatisfactory to prisoners, prison officials,
and law enforcement authorities alike and was severely criticized. 7
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR

1959, at 167 (1958), reprinted in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, app. A, at 43, 43.
Or, as the Sixth Circuit recently stated: "A detainer is simply a notice to prison
authorities that charges are pending against an inmate elsewhere, requesting the custodian to notify the sender before releasing the inmate." Ridgeway v. United States,
558 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1977). Detainers are generally classified into three
categories depending upon the reason the prisoner is wanted in the issuing jurisdiction: (1) to answer outstanding charges; (2) to begin serving an imposed but unexecuted sentence; or (3) for violation of parole or probation. Dauber, Reforming the

Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CPim. L. BULL. 669, 676 (1971). The detainers
discussed in this article are of the first type only, that is, notification that charges are
pending against the prisoner in another jurisdiction.
25. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4864, 4865.

26. However, over 10 years after the Agreement was first proposed, the Supreme Court held that, upon a prisoner's demand, a good faith effort must be made
to try the defendant. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969); text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra.
27. See, e.g., Bates, The Detained Prisoner and His Adjustment, FED. PROBATION, July-September 1945, at 16; Bennett, "The Last Full Ounce," FED. PROBATION, June 1959, at 20; Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers,
FED. PROBATION, July-September 1945, at 8; Dauber, Reforming the Detainer Sys-

tem: A Case Study, 7 CRiM. L. BULL. 669 (1971); Donnelly, The Connecticut Board
of Parole, 32 CONN. B.J. 26 (1958); Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional
System, FED. PROBATION, July-September 1945, at 13; Hincks, The Need for Comity
in Criminal Administration, FED. PROBATION, July-September 1945, at 3. See also

Meyer, Effective Utilization of Criminal Detainer Procedures, 61 IOWA L. REV. 659
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The defects in the detainer system did not, however, similarly
affect the federal government where federal charges were outstanding against inmates confined in state prisons. In such cases, the
federal government had available the time-honored writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum to obtain the production of state prisoners. 28 This writ is a federal district court order to produce a prisoner at federal trial. 29 State authorities have always complied with
this order, 30 and it is probably enforceable under the supremacy
clause, 3 1 although the courts have not decided the precise issue.
The detainer system did not adversely affect state prisoners against
whom federal charges were pending, since in such cases the inmate
could apply to the federal district court in which the charges were
pending, if the federal prosecutor had not done so, for a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum directing his production in federal
court to obtain a speedy trial. 32 A federal inmate, however, against
(1976); Perry, Effect of Detainers on Sentencing Policies, FED. PROBATION, July-

September 1945, at 11; Schindler, InterjurisdictionalConflict and the Right to a
Speedy Trial, 35 U. GIN. L. REV. 179 (1966); Walther, Detainer Warrants and the
Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 423 (1963); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal
Detainers in a Nutshell, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 753 (1971); Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Statutes, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 88 (1975); Note, The Interstate Criminal Detainerand the Sixth Amendment, 23 ARK. L. REV. 634 (1970); Note, The Detainer:A
Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (1948);
Note, Extending the Smith v. Hooey Duty to the Holding Jurisdiction, 23 ME. L.
REV. 201 (1971); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer
Statutes, 18 RUTGERs L. REV. 828 (1964); Comment, The DetainerSystem and the
Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 535 (1964); Note, Detainers and the
CorrectionalProcess, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417; Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy
Trialfor Convicts in Other Jurisdictions,77 YALE L.J. 767 (1968).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970). For a discussion of the history of this writ in
the federal courts, see notes 135-155 infra and accompanying text.
29. See note 11 supra.
30. Research has failed to disclose a case to the contrary. See United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 596 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). Potential noncompliance was
averted in Kyle v. United States, 211 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1954), where a state official
refused to disturb a state prisoner's custody, and the federal authorities apparently
did not pursue the issue, never obtaining a federal writ.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2, which provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See
text accompanying notes 155-197 infra.
32. See S. REP. No. 00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1975). Contra, Crow v.
United States, 323 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1963), in which the court stated that a state
prisoner, where a federal detainer had been lodged based on a complaint rather than
on an information or indictment, had no right to obtain the federal ad prosequendum
writ in connection with a speedy trial demand, because there was "no federal crimi-
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whom there was lodged a detainer based on an outstanding state
charge did suffer the adverse consequences that affected a state

inmate against whom there was lodged a state detainer. In such a
case, there was, prior to the Agreement, no simple mechanism for
this federal prisoner to clear the state detainer.33Thus, "the Agree-

ment was framed with State problems in mind."

CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION

Effective March 9, 1971, the United States became a party to
the Agreement. 34 The Council of State Governments envisioned
federal participation when it first proposed the Agreement in
1956. 35 The Agreement, however, was not introduced in Congress
until 1963, when Representative Emanuel Celler submitted the
Agreement to the House; 3 6 yet at that time, no action was taken.
In 1968, Representative Celler reintroduced the Agreement, 37 but
although the bill was passed by the House, 38 the Senate failed to
act on it. 3 9
The 1968 congressional history of the proposed legislation indicates that federal participation in the Agreement was sought
primarily to alleviate two serious problems: First, federal prisoners
could not initiate proceedings to clear state detainers filed against
them; 40 second, state prosecutors could only secure out-of-State
prisoners for trial pursuant to special contracts between State Governors. 4 ' Not unexpectedly, there is no mention in this legislative
nal proceeding pending which require[d] the [defendant's] presence in the federal

court." Id. at 890.
33. United States v.'Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 243 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Garth,
J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir.
1977)).
34. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, §§ 1-8, 84
Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475 (1970).
35. In the original proposal, "state" was defined as "a state of the United
States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States;
the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, PROGRAM FOR 1957, text of the
Agreement on Detainers, art. II(a), reprinted in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, app.
B, at 47, 50 (proposed text of Agreement).
36. H.R. 8365, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 16,728 (1963). See Comment, The Detainer System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. CH. L. REv. 535,
554 n.117 (1964). See also Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts
in OtherJurisdictions,77 YALE L.J. 767, 775 n.23 (1968).
37. H.R. 15421, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. 3575 (1968).

38.

114 CONG. REC. 11,793 (1968).

39. Id. at 11,980.
40. Id. at 11,795 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
41. Id. Following Representative Kastenmeier's remarks, Representative Poff
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history of a need for the federal government to obtain state prison-

ers; since the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum had
always been used.
Following Congress' failure in 1968 to enact the Agreement,
the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Hooey. 42 In Hooey the Court
held that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, as made

binding on the states under the fourteenth amendment, applies
even when the state cannot compel the presence of a federal pris-

oner detained in a federal institution. 43 Because of this decision,
enactment of the Agreement became imperative. Thus, the Agree-

ment was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee in early
1970. 44 Shortly thereafter, the House passed the bill4 5 and referred
it to the Senate; 46 the Senate passed the bill on November 23,
1970. 47 The accompanying House and Senate Committee on the
Judiciary reports, 48 as well as the floor speeches, 49 reflect concern

for potential dismissal of state cases against federal prisoners based
on Hooey. Thus, for example, in the opening paragraphs of the
Senate report, after noting Hooey, the Committee on the Judiciary

stated that it "is of the opinion that the enactment of this legislation would afford [state] defendants 50 in criminal cases the right to
a speedy trial and diminish the possibility of convictions being vacated or reversed because of a denial of this right." 5 1 The Senate
urged passage of the bill because
[u]nder the present [detainer] system it is impossible to get prompt disposition of criminal charges which are the basis for criminal detainment. For that
reason alone this legislation is justified.
[In addition,] in the interest of rehabilitation, this legislation is justified.
So long as there is a criminal charge outstanding ... and there has been no
resolution of that charge, the uncertainty militates against the interest of the
accused in pursuing rehabilitating programs.
Id. (remarks of Rep. Poff).
42. 393 U.S. 374 (1969). See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (conviction of state defendant reversed where state failed to make any effort to obtain de-

fendant for trial while he was federal inmate for period of seven years).
43. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 380-83 (1969).
44. H.R. 6951, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 12,920 (1970).
45.

116 CONG. REC. 14,000 (1970).

46. Id. at 14,156.
47.

Id. at 38,842.

48.

H.R.

REP.

No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 1356, 91st

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4864.

49. 116 CONG. REC. 38,840 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska); id. at 14,000
(remarks of Rep. Poff).
50. Unquestionably, in this context, the committee was referring only to state,
not federal, defendants.
51. S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864, 4864.
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report's "Statement of the Facts" section, however, contains no reference to the rehabilitative purposes of the Agreement. Indeed,

this purpose of the Agreement does not appear until the third page
of the Senate report. 52 Thus, while Congress was concerned with
the adverse effects of outstanding state detainers on federal prisoners, it appears that the possibility of dismissal of state cases under
Hooey was the real impetus for enactment of the Agreement. This
conclusion is buttressed by the failure of the legislative history to
discuss expected use of the Agreement by the United States as a
"Receiving State" to obtain sentenced state prisoners. 5 3 Although
the Assistant to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia
noted that the Agreement would enable "District prosecuting authorities to have a prisoner in a party State made available for disposition of local detainers," 54 this comment had no applicability to
the federal government, which had available to it the ad j1rosequendum writ. Rather, the comment applied only to the "local"
District of Columbia courts (excluding, of course, the United States
which did not have
District Court for the District of Columbia),
55
available the ad prosequendum writ.
The bill enacting the Agreement became effective March 9,
1971.56 Not until almost six years later, however, did federal indictments come under attack by sentenced state prisoners whose
appearances in federal court had been obtained not pursuant to the
Agreement, but under the traditional federal writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum.
52. Id. at 3, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4866.
53. The Agreement defines a "Receiving State" as "the State in which trial is
to be had on any indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to article III or
article IV hereof." Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2,
art. II(c), 84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4475 (1970). The
Agreement defines a "Sending State" as "a State in which a prisoner is incarcerated
at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to article III
hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to
article IV hereof." Id. art. II(b), 18 U.S.C. app., at 4476.
54. Letter from Graham W. Watt, Assistant to the Commissioner, Government
of the District of Columbia, to Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1970), reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1970); S.REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4869, 4870.
55. The only writ of habeas corpus authorized in the District of Columbia Code
is the ad subjiciendum writ to test the legality of detention. D.C. CODE §§ 16-1901 to
16-1909 (1966). Of course, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is authorized to issue the ad prosequendum writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(5) (1970). See Downey v. United States, 91 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
56. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat.
1397 (1970), reprintedin 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475 (1970).
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JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE AGREEMENT

In United States v. Mauro,57 the Government appealed from
orders of a federal district court which dismissed indictments on

the ground of noncompliance with the Agreement. The facts of
Mauro were unexceptional: On November 3, 1975, defendants

John Mauro and John Fusco were charged with criminal contempt
of court for their refusal to testify before a federal grand jury. 5 8 At
the time of these indictments, defendants were New York State

inmates serving unrelated state sentences. On November 5, 1975,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York issued separate writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for
Mauro and Fusco pursuant to which they were arraigned on their
respective indictments on November 24, 1975. 59 Defendants remained in federal custody and next appeared in court on December 2, 1975.60 At this appearance, after setting trial dates in

February for Fusco and in March for Mauro, the district court
judge noted that the local federal facility, in which defendants were
being held, was overcrowded. 61 Thus the court ordered both to be
returned to state custody and to be "Writ down for trial." 62 Shortly
thereafter, the two were returned to state custody. 63 The court issued ad prosequendum writs again, and each defendant was pro-

duced once more in the district court. Prior to these appearances,
however, defendants moved to dismiss the indictments on the
ground that the Agreement had been violated, because they had
been returned to state custody without having been tried on the

federal indictments. The district court agreed, and ordered dis64
missal of the indictments.

57. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 76-1596) (consolidated with United States v. Fusco).
58. Id. at 589-90. Defendants were charged with criminal contempt of court
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).

59.

United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46

U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).

60. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Id. Both Mauro and Fusco were held at the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. Id. While New York City has a federal institution,
most cities having federal district courts do not. In such cases, the United States
Bureau of Prisons enters into contracts with local correctional institutions for the
lodging of federal defendants. See United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 229 n1.3 (3d
Cir. 1977) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1970).
63. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
64. United States v. Mauro, 414 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 544 F.2d 588
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
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On appeal, the Government argued that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes enforceable federal court process
and not a detainer under the Agreement. The Government asserted that the Agreement did not, in effect, repeal this writ.
Therefore, the Government contended that the Agreement is not
the sole means whereby federal prosecutors may obtain sentenced
state prisoners for trial, and that its provisions are inapplicable
when a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is employed. 65 In
addition, the Government urged that the Agreement, according to
States only as a
its congressional history, applied to the United
66
State."
"Receiving
a
as
not
State,"
"Sending
By a divided court, the Second Circuit rejected the Government's arguments and affirmed the orders of dismissal. 67 The
majority rejected the Government's contention that the habeas
corpus ad prosequendum writ is mandatory and held that the writ
is a detainer. 6s Implicit in this holding was a finding that the writ
also constituted a prosecutor's "written request for temporary custody or availability" 69 of the prisoner, because unlike article III,
which governs prisoner-initiated requests and is triggered solely by
the pendency of a detainer, article IV, which governs prosecutorinitiated requests, is triggered by the "written request" only when
a detainer has already been lodged. Thus, to decide that dismissal
of the indictment was required under article IV(e), the Mauro
majority, albeit sub silentio, must have decided that the writ qualified as such a "written request." 70 Moreover, the court held that
the Agreement is the sole means of exchanging prisoners between
the party states to the Agreement. 71 The court also relied upon
65. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
66. Id. at 593.
67. Id. at 595.
68. Id. at 592.
69. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, art. IV(c),
84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4476 (1970).
70. This reading of Mauro is supported by United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52), in
which the majority opinion, authored by judge Mansfield, who had dissented in
Mauro, stated: "We held [in Mauro] .. .that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes a 'detainer' and a 'request' by a prosecuting authority within
the meaning of the [Agreement], with the present author dissenting in that case from
the majority's holding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes a
'detainer.' " Id. at 736.
71. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
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language in the Agreement and in its legislative history in holding
that the United States is both a sending and receiving state 72 and
that the writ remains extant only where a defendant is imprisoned
73
in a nonparty jurisdiction.
Judge Mansfield dissented in Mauro on the ground that a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is different from a detainer and
is a valid order under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5). 74 He distinguished a
detainer from a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on
two grounds. First, Judge Mansfield concluded that the writ is a
federal court order to produce a prisoner at federal trial while a
detainer is a mere notification of pending charges and a request
that the prisoner be detained. 75 Second, Judge Mansfield would
have held that, unlike a detainer, a writ is enforceable against the
states under the supremacy clause.76 Additionally, he concluded
that neith4r the face of the Agreement nor its legislative history
indicates congressional intent to repeal the federal statute concerning writs of habeas corpus. 7 7 Thus, Judge Mansfield would have
found that where a federal court issues a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum to obtain a prisoner, the Agreement is inapplicable.78
The Second Circuit decision in United States v. Ford79 followed shortly after Mauro. In Ford, unlike in Mauro, authorities
lodged a federal detainer prior to issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum.8 0 Thus, the court was not asked to determine
whether the writ constituted a "detainer" and a "request," as decided by Mauro, but instead whether it constituted a "request"
where a federal detainer had already been filed. While this distinction may seem at first glance to be overly technical in light of the
Mauro conjunctive holding, it provided a basis for Judge Mansfield,
who had dissented in Mauro, to author the majority opinion in Ford.
The court held that the Agreement comes into play whenever a
federal detainer, as distinguished from a writ of habeas corpus ad
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id. at 594.
74. Id. at 595 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 596 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 597 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970)).
78. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
79. 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 77-52).
80. Compare id. at 735 with United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 589-90 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
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prosequendum, is lodged against a sentenced state prisoner.8 1 Ford
also presented the court with the question whether claimed violations of the Agreement could be raised for the first time on appeal
82
without having been presented at trial.
In Ford defendant was arrested in Illinois pursuant to two federal warrants, one issued by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the other by the District Court for Massachusetts 8 3 Ford was first turned over to Massachusetts federal
authorities. The federal charges against him were dropped, but he
subsequently pleaded guilty to state charges and was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment. New York authorities then lodged their warrant with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a detainer, 84 and
after Ford began serving his Massachusetts sentence, the Southern
District of New York issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain him for arraignment. Ford was then produced from
Massachusetts before the District Court for the Southern District
of New York for arraignment on April 1, 1974, at which time he
pleaded not guilty to an indictment charging him with bank robbery and aggravated bank robbery. 85 On April 3, 1974, a superseding indictment was filed charging Ford and another with the same
bank robbery and additional crimes involving the use of a firearm
in the commission of a bank robbery, interstate transportation of a
stolen automobile, and conspiracy. 86 Ford was taken from federal
custody, which he had not yet left, and again was produced in federal court on April 15, 1974, for arraignment on this new indictment; trial was then set for May 28, 1974. Prior to trial, the Government moved for an adjournment, and the trial was adjourned to
August 21. Thereafter, on June 14, 1974, Ford sought and was
granted permission to be returned to Massachusetts, where his lawyer was located, so that he could prepare for trial. In August, the
trial was again rescheduled to November 14, 1974, this time because the judge originally assigned to the case had resigned from
81. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
82. See United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 634-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2937 (1977), where the issue was, inter alia, whether the failure to raise a
claimed violation of the Agreement before trial constitutes a waiver under FED. R.
CiuM. P. 12(f).
83. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 735 n.1.
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the bench. In November, the Government moved for an additional
adjournment. The motion was granted and trial was reset for February 18, 1975.87 On that date, June 11, 1975 was set as a new trial
date. In March, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York announced a crash program, to begin June 2, for the disposition of civil cases. As a result, Ford's trial was postponed until August 8, 1975.88 On August 8, 1975, pursuant to a second writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Ford was obtained from Massachusetts for trial. At the beginning of trial, Ford again moved for
dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds but did not contend that the Agreement's requirement that trial begin within 120
days of a prosecutor-initiated production had been violated. The
speedy trial motion was denied, and Ford was thereafter convicted
by a jury on all counts.8 9
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a split decision, felt "constrained to hold that, whether or not a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes a 'detainer,' . . . once a federal detainer has
been lodged against a state prisoner the habeas writ constitutes a
'written request for temporary custody' within the meaning of Article IV of the [Agreement]." 90 The court decided that Ford, by requesting to be returned to Massachusetts, had waived the Agreement's requirement that a prisoner not be returned to the sending
state without trial on the charges for which he was obtained. 91 The
court, however, declined similarly to find such a waiver with respect to the Agreement's 120-day requirement. 92 Although not expressly stated, under the court's holding Ford's speedy trial motions included by implication an assertion of a violation of the
Agreement's 120-day limitation. The majority found several of the
delays unjustified 93 but failed to discuss Ford's failure to present
the claimed violation of the Agreement in the district court. 94
87. Id. at 735.
88. Id. at 736.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 742 (citation omitted). Judges Mansfield and Meskill comprised the
court's majority; Judge Moore dissented.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 743. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538,
§ 2, art. IV(c), 84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprintedin 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4476 (1970);
text accompanying note 8 supra.
93. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
94. Cf. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, No. 76-6559 (finding that defendant waived violation of Agreement by
failing to present issue to district court or to court of appeals prior to filing amended

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/1

14

1978]

Fried: The Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Federal Government
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

Several federal courts of appeals in addition to the Second Circuit have considered the applicability of the Agreement to writs of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. In United States v. Scallion,9 5 a
unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit held that a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the
Agreement. The court reviewed the legislative history of the

Agreement and concluded that Congress did not intend that the
Agreement establish the exclusive mechanism for prisoner transfer
for prosecution. 96 Moreover, following an approach similar to that
of Judge Mansfield in his Mauro dissent, the Fifth Circuit stated:
"Both historically and substantively, the writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum issued by a federal district is entirely different from
a 'detainer' as [defined in the legislative history]." 97 The court,
however, followed Mauro in rejecting the Government's contention
that the United States joined the Agreement only as a sending
98
state and not as a receiving state.

petition for rehearing). In Ford the Government, in its brief submitted prior to

Mauro, argued that the district court's decision in Mauro was incorrect, raising essentially the same arguments presented in the court of appeals in that case. Brief for
Appellee at 21, United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52). The Government also contended that
Mauro, if affirmed, could only logically apply to the bank robbery count, the sole
charge which formed the basis of the first writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
Petition for Rehearing En Bane for Appellee at 17-20, United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
77-52). The Government contended that the other charges in the superseding indictment, charges on which Ford had not been brought and returned on, should
not have been dismissed. Brief for Appellee at 28, United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d
732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
While this argument was neither referred to by the Ford majority nor its dissent,
the Second Circuit accepted it in United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 635
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 2937 (1977). Similarly, in United States v. Cumberbatch, 563 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1977), the court affirmed conviction, rejecting defendant's contention that dismissal of a first indictment with prejudice for violation of
the Agreement, required dismissal of a supplemental indictment; the court thus recognized a distinction between the original charge and additional charges contained
in the superseding indictment.
95. 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 76-6559.
96. Id. at 1171.
97. Id. at 1173. As noted by the court, according to both the House and Senate
Judiciary Committee reports: "A detainer is a notification filed with the institution in
which a [prisoner] is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1970); S.REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864, 4865).

98. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, No. 76-6559.
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Thereafter, in United States v. Kenaan,9 9 the First Circuit,
approving both Scallion and the Mauro dissent, 0 0° held that a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer under the
Agreement. 10 1 The court held unanimously that a detainer is different from a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in purpose, legal
basis, and historical context. Thus, the two constitute distinct
methods for obtaining custody of prisoners for federal prosecution. 10 2 Moreover, the court viewed the Agreement as aimed at
curbing abuses which are not associated with the ad prosequendum
writ, because the writ "is carried out immediately and is dis10 3
charged when the prisoner is returned to state custody."'
Almost immediately following Kenaan, the Sixth Circuit in
Ridgeway v. United States' 0 4 joined the First 10 5 and Fifth' 0 6 Circuits in holding that the ad prosequendum writ is not a detainer
under the Agreement. The court noted that the Agreement's legislative history lacks express reference to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.' 0 7 The court then examined the origins of
the Agreement and summarized the effects of the detainer system
on an inmate.' 0 8 Finally, the court concluded that the Agreement
was designed to correct deficiencies in the detainer system that are
not present with use of the ad prosequendum writ.' 0 9 The court
refused to hold that the Agreement had either implicitly repealed
section 2241(c)(5)"- 0 or modified the writ authorized by that section, and concluded that Congress did not intend "to make the
Agreement the exclusive means by which a state prisoner can be
brought to trial in federal court.""'
Subsequent to Kenaan, the Third Circuit followed Mauro. In
99. 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3158 (US.
Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-206).
100. See id. at 915.
101. Id. at 917.
102. Id. at 915.
103. Id. at 916.
104. 558 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1977).
105. United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3158 (U.S. Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-206).
106. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, No. 76-6559.
107. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1977).
108. Id. at 360-61.
109. Id. at 362.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970).
111. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977) (citation
omitted). Kenaan was not cited in Ridgeway probably because the two decisions
were practically contemporaneous.
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United States v. Sorrell,i1 2 a divided en bane court held that an ad
prosequendum writ is a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement."13 The court further held, as did the Second Circuit in Ford,
that such writ constitutes both a "detainer" and a "written request
for temporary custody or availability." 1 14 Two separate dissenting
opinions were filed in Sorrell.1115 In the first, Judge Weis stated that

the Agreement was poorly drafted legislation."i 6 He would have followed Kenaan, Scallion, and Ridgeway, and thus would have held
that the writ is not a detainer, since he believed that Congress did

not intend to limit the power of federal courts to issue the ad prosequendum writ. 117 Judge Weis, however, rejected the Govern-

ment's contention that Congress intended the federal government
to participate in the Agreement only as a sending state,1 1 8 prefer-

ring "to uphold the unrestricted availability of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum."" 9 In the second dissenting opinion, Judge Garth
construed the Agreement as covering cases involving federal-state

transfers only if state boundaries are crossed. His construction was
drawn principally from an ingenious conclusion that "transfers of

'custody' are not the triggering events under Article IV(e),"-1 2 0

coupled with his belief that, while the federal government did not
become a party to the Agreement in a receiving capacity only, the
Agreement's effect on the United States was only considered in
112. 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977) (en bane).
113. Id. at 231.
114. Id. at 231 n.6.
115. See id. at 235 (Weis, J., dissenting); id. at 238 (Garth, J., dissenting). These
dissenting opinions were also filed in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d
Cir. 1977) (en bane). In Thompson the Third Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the Agreement does not apply where the United States prosecutes a
sentenced state prisoner within the geographical boundaries of the state in which the
federal district court is situated. Id. at 234 n.2.
116. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Weis,
J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir.
1977)).
117. Id. at 236 (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
118. Id. at 235-36 (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
119. Id. at 238 (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)) (citations omitted). This position, although
rejected in Mauro and Scallion, is supported by S. REP. No. 00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
984 (1975), which refers to a proposed amendment to the Agreement designed "to
clarify the intent of the Congress by providing that the Federal Government is a
participant in the Agreement only in the capacity of a 'sending state.' "
120. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 242 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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that capacity. Judge Garth would have had the court try "to make
as much sense out of the Agreement" 121 as possible until Congress
could take the necessary corrective action.
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Harris,122

held that issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does
not constitute lodging a detainer under the Agreement, and thus
"the dismissal requirements of the Agreement apply only to detainers and not to federal writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.'

1 23

Although this determination was not necessary to the

court's holding because Harris involved an unsentenced state prisoner who had been produced in federal court, the Eighth Circuit
soon applied Harris to a state prisoner who had been serving a
state sentence. In this case, United States v. Frye,'124 the court
recognized disagreement among the circuits, and stated: "[lit is our
view that Congress did not intend by adoption of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act to repeal or modify the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) authorizing the production of prisoners to
125
testify or for trial."'
Is

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD
PROSEQUENDUM A DETAINER?

Notwithstanding Mauro126 and Sorrell,127 review and analysis
of the nature, purpose, and history of the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, together with examination of the Agreement's
legislative history, requires the conclusion that the writ is separate
and distinct from the detainer. A necessary corollary of this result
is that the issuance, execution, and satisfaction of the writ neither
involves the Agreement nor invokes any of its terms.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum
The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is one of several
kinds of habeas corpus writs. 128 It empowers a court to order the
121. Id. at 244 (Garth, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
122. 566 F.2d 610 (1977).
123. Id. at 613.
124. 566 F.2d 1090 (1977).
125. Id. at 1091.
126. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
127. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
128. The various habeas corpus writs are provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2241
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production of a prisoner from one jurisdiction to another for prosecution. 129 This writ is one of the "auxiliary or processive" writs,
because its purpose is to aid the jurisdiction of a particular
court. 130 It differs from a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,
which is an original or remedial writ used to test the legality of the
detention of a prisoner "with a view to an order releasing the
[prisoner].' 13 1 The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum has been
described as the "Great Writ,' 32 and when "writ of habeas corpus" is used alone, usually only the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is intended. 133
Although this article concerns an auxiliary writ, it is necessary
to analyze briefly the federal habeas corpus statute. This approach
is warranted, because the development of federal writs of habeas
corpus-both the3 4 Great Writ and the processive writs-followed
parallel courses.1
In section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress authorized
all the .. courts of the United States . . .to issue writs of scire
facias, habeas corpus, (e) and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law. And . . . either of the justices of the supreme
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into
the cause of commitment.-Provided, that writs of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same,
1 35
or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.

In Ex parte BollUman,' 36 the Supreme Court held that the first sentence of section 14 empowered a federal court to issue auxiliary
(1970). For the provision for the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see id.
§ 2241(c)(5).
129. See Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961).
130. See generally Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8
F.R.D. 179, 184-87 (1949).
131. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 n.5 (1963).
132. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961). Blackstone called the
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner
of illegal confinement." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131.
133. See Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961).
134. See id.
135. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
136. 8 U.S. 46, 4 Cranch 75 (1807).
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writs, including writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, 13 7 and
that the second sentence empowered a federal judge or justice to
issue the Great Writ for inquiry into the lawfulness of a petitioner's
detention.13 8 The second sentence of section 14 did not, however,
make federal habeas corpus available as a remedy to a prisoner
held in state custody. 139 Such availability was not extended until
1833,140 when, as a result of the nullification controversy which

arose in South Carolina, it became necessary for Congress to extend the Great Writ to federal officers held in state custody for the
141
performance of their official duties.
Although a state prisoner, who was convicted as a result of his
activities as a federal officer acting under federal authority, was not
authorized to use an ad subjiciendum writ to challenge his detention until 1833, the federal auxiliary or processive writs, authorized
in the original Judiciary Act, already extended to bring a state prisoner into federal court to testify. 142 Notwithstanding erroneous
dictum in Ex parte Dorr 143 indicating that a federal judge was authorized to issue a habeas corpus writ only to bring a state prisoner
to federal court as a witness, 144 it is apparent that a state prisoner
was subject to production in federal court for prosecution as well.145
137. See id. at 59, 4 Cranch at 96.
138. See id. See also Longsdorf, supra note 130, at 186.
139. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 46, 59-60, 4 Cranch 75, 97 (1807).
140. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632. An earlier provision, Act of
Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, which applied to removal of prosecutions of
federal officers for acts relating to the customs laws, did not provide a habeas corpus
mechanism; rather, it provided for a petition to be filed with the circuit court for
removal. Id. Thus, this provision is generally considered outside the realm of habeas
corpus.
141. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 70 (1890).
142. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73; Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 113, 3
How. 103 (1845).
143. 44 U.S. 113, 3 How. 103 (1845).
144. Id. at 115, 3 How. at 105. This dictum inexplicably ignores the Act of
1833, which extended the reach of federal habeas corpus to a limited class of state
prisoners, that is, federal officers acting under federal authority. See note 140 supra
and accompanying text. It also inexplicably failed to recognize Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. 46, 4 Cranch 75 (1807), which the Supreme Court has characterized as finding
"authority for the writ ad prosequenduni in the reference to habeas corpus in the
first sentence of § 14 [of the Judiciary Act of 1789]." Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S.
611, 617-18 (1961). See also Longsdorf, supra note 130, at 185.
145. In Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107 (1893), the Supreme Court held that the
writ of habeas corpus cum causa is the proper writ for removal of a state prisoner
under state indictment to federal court for trial. It appears that in Paul an ad prosequendum writ was "actually used." See Longsdorf, supra note 130, at 185. Apparently, this is the earliest use of this writ to obtain production of a state prisoner
for trial in federal court, although the writ is generally assumed to be almost 200
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Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was next expanded in 1842
to reach a foreign national held in state or federal custody for acts
committed under foreign authority. 146 Thereafter, during the Reconstruction period Congress extended federal habeas corpus to
state prisoners generally. 14 7 The Supreme Court has stated that the
1867 Act "was the last important statutory change' 14 in habeas
corpus jurisdiction.
Following a series of revisions,14 9 the habeas corpus statutes
took their present form,' 50 and for the first time a statute made
explicit reference to the writ ad prosequendum.' 5 1 As the Supreme
Court noted, however, this reference did not change the thenexisting habeas corpus law. 1 52 According to the Court, in the 1875
revision of the Statutes at Large "the ad prosequendum writ,
necessary as a tool for jurisdictional potency as well as administra53
tive efficiency, [was] extended to the entire country.'1
years old, see Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 620 (1961). Thus, it seems that
the reason for this early disuse of the writ is that, since the writ by its terms would
return the prisoner to state custody at the conclusion of the federal trial, the states
honored the writ as a matter of course in nonremoval situations. Moreover, since the
early federal criminal jurisdiction was narrow in scope, the potential for conflict was
minimal. In any event, there are no early reported federal prosecutions in which a
court saw a necessity for noting that the federal defendant had been produced in
federal court from state custody pursuant to an ad prosequendum writ, if indeed such
a writ was employed.
146. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. This Act resulted from a diplomatic protest filed by England following the trial in the courts of New York of a
Canadian soldier, reported in People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). See
also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9 (1963).
147. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, chs. 27, 28, 14 Stat. 385.
148. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9 (1963).
149.

See generally Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and

Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407 (1953).
150. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970).
151. See Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 619 (1961) (footnote omitted).
The statute referring to the writ ad prosequendum states:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records
of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
152. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 619 (1961).
153. Id. at 618. For the text of the Revised Statutes which consolidated into
positive law the antecedent habeas corpus legislation, see Longsdorf, supra note 149,
at 412-14.
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Thus, the ad prosequendum writ is traceable to the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and even further to common law origins. Although not

the Great Writ, it is nevertheless a species of that most celebrated
of writs in English law. 154 To fulfill its function when issued by a
federal court, the writ ad prosequendum is probably enforceable
against state authorities by virtue of the supremacy clause. 55

That the federal courts have never been called upon to invoke
federal supremacy in enforcing the processive writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum does not mean that the writ is complied with
only as a matter of comity. Although the Mauro court indicated
that "'[w]hile a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum may use

mandatory language, the jurisdiction to which such a writ is addressed is relied upon to cooperate in turning over the defendant
to the other sovereign,' "-156 the precise issue of federal supremacy
has never been decided. In Carbo v. United States, 157 the Supreme Court noted that the federal ad prosequendum writ in ques-

tion had been given full recognition under the comity that exists
between sovereigns in the federal-state system 158 and stated that
"[i]n view of the cooperation extended by the [state] authorities in
honoring the writ, it is unnecessary to decide what would be the
effect of a similar writ absent such cooperation.' 1 9 But, as Judge

Mansfield wrote in dissent in Mauro, there is "no doubt that if a
state institution refused to obey a federal writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum properly issued pursuant to § 2241 and thus provoked a federal-state confrontation, the writ would be held enforci160
ble [sic] against the institution under the Supremacy Clause."

154. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131.
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note
31 supra.
156. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596) (quoting United States v. Oliver, 523
F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1975)). The cases cited in Oliver as support for this proposition, however, do not decide the issue of enforceability of the ad prosequendum
writ. Rather, these cases discuss the enforceability issue only in dicta: Carbo v.
United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961) (Court held that federal district court can issue ad
prosequendum writ beyond territorial limitation of particular district); McDonald v,
Ciccone, 409 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1969) (state prisoner on federal writ lacks standing to
prevent his return to state custody); Moses v. Kipp, 232 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1956)
(state prisoner on writ to federal court has no standing to attack his return to state
jurisdiction); Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1942) (state prisoner on
writ to federal court properly returned to state jurisdiction does not commence federal sentence until returned to federal custody after service of state sentence).
157. 364 U.S. 611 (1961).
158. See id. at 621.
159. Id. at 621 n.20.
160. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 596 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.,
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Additional support for the position that federal supremacy requires
state authorities to honor a federal ad prosequendum writ was advanced by one commentator:
Where there is state imprisonment and a pending federal prosecution there is, clearly, no place for the principle of "comity."
Federal law authorizes the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held, in
Carbo v. United States, that this power is not confined within
the borders of the issuing judicial district. In the Carbo case
there was consent by the State of New York, the imprisoning
state. Thus the decision does not consider or reject the authority
holding that such consent is necessary before the writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum can issue. However, that authority is
erroneous, since the statutory writ is the supreme law of the
land and the imprisoning state has no choice but to yield the
prisoner, anything in its law to the contrary notwithstanding. 16
The authority referred to is a line of cases which stems from
Ponzi v. Fessenden,16 2 where the Supreme Court implied in dictum
that compliance with a writ of habeas corpus directing the production of a prisoner for trial was a matter of comity. 163 Yet neither
Ponzi nor any of the decisions involved a state refusal to comply
with the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 16 4 Theredissenting) (footnote omitted), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 76-1596). See also United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 915 n.8 (1st Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3158 (U.S. Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-206);
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, No. 76-6559.
161. Schindler, InterjurisdictionalConflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35
U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
162. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
163. See id. at 262.
164. For cases in which courts stated in dicta that compliance with the ad prosequendum writ is a matter of comity between the state and federal government, see
United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1975) (alleged violation of plan for
prompt disposition of criminal cases); Trigg v. Moseley, 433 F.2d 364 (10th Cir.
1970) (federal prisoner cannot obtain federal writ for removal of state detainer before
exhausting state remedies); McDonald v. Ciccone, 409 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1969) (state
prisoner on federal writ lacks standing to prevent his return to state custody);
McDonald v. United States, 403 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1968) (state prisoner on federal
writ lacks standing to attack return to state custody); Crow v. United States, 323 F.2d
888 (8th Cir. 1963) (state prisoner appealing state conviction cannot obtain federal
writ for federal trial); Moses v. Kipp, 232 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1956) (state prisoner on
writ to federal court has no standing to attack his return to state jurisdiction);
Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1942) (state prisoner on writ to federal
court properly returned to state jurisdiction does not commence federal sentence
until returned to federal custody after service of state sentence).
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fore, cases such as Stainphill v. United States, 165 Strand v. Schmittroth,1 66 and In re Nelson 16 7 are not authority for the proposition

that comity requires compliance with an ad prosequendum writ.
In Stamphill the issue was whether the state's surrender of a defendant pursuant to a writ was for trial only or included service of
his sentence. 168 The issue in Strand was whether a federal
probationer could be arrested by state authorities. 169 Finally, Nelson concerned the enforceability of a federal mandate calling for
service of a federal sentence. In Nelson no statutory authority was
found, absent state consent, to enforce that mandate, 170 although it
seems that Congress could enact such statutory authority if it
wished to do so.
The most important case in the context of federal supremacy of
the ad prosequendum writ is Ponzi v. Fessenden.171 In Ponzi Chief
Justice Taft stated that the federal system of two sovereigns requires "a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due and orderly procedure.'

1 72

At issue in Ponzi was the au-

thority of the United States Attorney General to authorize the
transfer of a federal prisoner to state custody. The case did not involve the enforceability of federal process.173 Ponzi, therefore, does
not support the proposition that the federal writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum is not enforceable against a state prisoner. Moreover, the broad dictum in Ponzi is perhaps grounded in the established principle that the states have no power to issue a habeas corpus writ against the federal government. 174 As the Supreme Court
has explained, to permit otherwise would be "inconsistent with the
supremacy of the general government, as defined and limited by
the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof."' 175 Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court
165. 135 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1943).
166. 251 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 886 (1957).

167. 434 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1970).
168.

Stamphill v. United States, 135 F.2d 177, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1943).

169. Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 355
U.S. 886 (1957).

170. In re Nelson, 434 F.2d 748, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1970).
171. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
172. Id. at 259.
173. Id. at 261-62. The authority of the Attorney General to authorize the transfer of a federal prisoner to state custody is now expressly granted. 18 U.S.C. § 4085
(1970).
174. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
175. Robb v. Connelly, 111 U.S. 624, 630 (1884) (discussing Ableman v. Booth,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858)).
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overbroadly stated the federal-state relationship with reference to
comity in recognition of the supremacy principle and with an
awareness of the potential for conflict or misunderstanding inherent
in that relationship.
Comity, therefore, especially in connection with the auxiliary
federal ad prosequendum writ, simply means that absent special
circumstances, the federal courts will forbear from interference
with state court jurisdiction. In other words, comity is a corollary
of the rule of first-acquired jurisdiction that was held in In re
Johnson176 to be "so frequently applied in cases of conflicting jurisdiction between Federal and state courts."' 1 7 This rule 178 has been
stated to be "one of comity only, and has a wide application in civil
cases, but a limited one in criminal cases."'17 9 One lower federal
court has stated:
It has also become well settled that if a party is on trial or in
duress-that is, in actual custody-under the authority of a state
court, no other state court, and no United States court, should,
except in an urgent case, take the defendant from that custody,
prior to an actual release or relinquishment of the right to the
custody on the part of the court before which the matter is pend180
ing.
These interrelated rules of comity and first-acquired jurisdiction
were self-imposed by the federal courts early in their history to
prevent disruption of the delicate balance of federalism. Examination of the early precedents concerning federal supremacy indicates
that the federal government has the power to enforce auxiliary or
processive writs of habeas corpus if it chooses to do so.
In Ableman v. Booth,' 81 the Supreme Court held that a state
court lacks the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a person held by an officer of the United States under federal author176.

167 U.S. 120 (1897).

177. Id. at 125.
178. In In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120 (1897), the Court stated:
[I]t has been the settled doctrine of this court that a court having possession
of a person or property cannot be deprived of the right to deal with such
person or property until its jurisdiction is exhausted, and that no other court
has the right to interfere with such custody or possession.
Id. at 125.
179. Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 483, 486 (1910) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
180. Ex parte Marrin, 164 F. 631, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1908) (citations omitted).
181. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
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ity. 18 2 The Court based this conclusion on the supremacy clause 18 3
and observed that the power of the United States to enforce its
own laws through its own courts does not need "the consent of the
State in which the culprit [is] found."' 18 4 A person who has allegedly committed a federal offense may, of course, be prosecuted
in federal court. 18 5 As a result, the federal government must possess the corresponding power to issue appropriate process to compel production of a person before its courts. As the Supreme Court
indicated in an analogous context, to rely upon state cooperation18is
"an element of weakness [not] to be found in the Constitution." 6
Similarly, the fortuitous circumstance that a person who has allegedly violated federal law is in state custody cannot deny the
United States the power to enforce federal law should it choose to
do so, since "[n]o State government can exclude [the United
States] from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the
87
Constitution.'1
The judicial power to adjudicate criminal prosecutions brought
by the executive department, which is charged with the responsibility to prosecute violations of the law, "carries with it all those
incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual
execution."' 8 81 Indeed, in Cohens v. Virginia,18 9 the Supreme Court
noted that while a state cannot extraterritorially apprehend a fugitive, but instead must make a demand on the executive of the state
in which the fugitive is located, this principle does not apply to the
United States when it exercises the power of arrest outside its exclusive jurisdiction and without regard to the necessity for a demand
upon the executive of the state. By analogy, therefore, a similar
power should exist to permit the United States to compel a state to
yield custody over a person held under state authority.' 9 0 A re182. Id. See also Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).

183. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note
31 supra.
184. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 515 (1858).
185. Federal judicial power over criminal prosecutions was established in the
early 1800's. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). The Supreme
Court has noted that "[i]t was essential . . . to its very existence as a Government,
that [the United States] should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws." Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 518 (1858).
186. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879) (upholding constitutionality
of federal statute authorizing removal of criminal case from state to federal court).
187. Id.
188. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 192, 6 Wheat. 264, 429 (1821).
189. 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
190. Where the defendant seeks to involve FED. R. CruM. P. 20 (transfer from
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quirement of state consent would place enforcement of federal law
under state control, at least in this limited circumstance where the
defendant is in state custody. Such a result would be inconsistent
with federalism, which establishes the federal government as su91
preme. 1
Federal and state governments are, of course, distinct. They
have been characterized as "independent of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres.' 1 92 Because of this independence, the Supreme Court has noted that "within their respective
spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial
process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion
may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority.' ' 19 3 This
latter qualification indicates that states may not deny federal judicial
process. If federal supremacy is respected, there can be no other
result.
This supremacy principle underlies the federal removal statutes, 194 the constitutionality of which is well-settled. 195 In a removed criminal case, the processive or auxiliary writ of habeas corpus cum causa is the traditional means of securing a state prisoner's
district for plea and sentence), while incarcerated in a state institution, commentators
have stated: "A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum should serve every purpose of a warrant of arrest .... 4 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 2081, at 146 (1951 ed.). See id. at 149 (Wright ed. Supp. 1964). See
also Clark v. United States, 367 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1966). While such production
pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 20 is accomplished by the defendant's actions rather
than by federal process, this distinction is irrelevant to resolving the delicate issue of
federal-state relations. Thus Clark, as well as the cited commentary, support the
proposition that the ad prosequendum writ can compel production similarly to an
arrest warrant.
191. For a classic statement of federal supremacy, see McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 159, 164, 4 Wheat. 316, 326-27 (1819). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 2 ("This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...shall be the supreme Law of the
").
Land ....
192. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1871).
193. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
194. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1970). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1970) (congressional
assassination, kidnapping, and assault), which provides in part: "If Federal investigative or prosecutive jurisdiction is asserted for a violation of this section, such assertion shall suspend the exercise of jurisdiction by a State or local authority, under any
applicable State or local law, until Federal action is terminated." Id. § 351(f). While
perhaps technically not a removal statute, this provision is analogous to removal and
is grounded, as it must be, in the concept of supremacy. Although there are no reported decisions concerning this provision, it would appear to be constitutionally
valid, as are the removal statutes. See notes 195 & 196 infra.
195. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) (power to remove criminal cases); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 141, 161, 1 Wheat. 304, 349 (1816)
(power to remove civil cases).
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presence in federal court, 1 9 6 although the present statute merely

provides:
If the defendant or defendants are in actual custody on process issued by the State court, the district court shall issue its
writ of habeas corpus, and the marshal shall thereupon take such
defendant or defendants into his custody and deliver a copy of
the writ to the clerk of such State court. 197
A fortiori, if Congress can authorize compulsory removal of an entire state prosecution into federal court, it should be empowered to
authorize compulsory production of state prisoners for trial on federal charges.
If the production of a state prisoner in federal court depends
solely upon the deferential doctrine of comity, an uncooperative or
hostile state could prevent effective enforcement of federal criminal

law. Such a state could permit the state penitentiary to be a
sanctuary. Therefore, it would be anomalous to conclude that the
federal government can arrest a person anywhere in the country
but may not take custody over a person accused of violating federal
law simply because the person is in state custody. Thus, the power
to issue a writ of habeas corpus, even if exercised infrequently, is

an indispensable component of federal supremacy.
Differences Between a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Ad Prosequendum and a Detainer
While the Agreement does not expressly define a detainer, the
legislative history provides the following definition: "A detainer is a

notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving
a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal
charges in another jurisdiction.' 19 3 More specifically defined, "a

detainer is simply a request, grounded in notions of comity, that
the detaining institution notify the law enforcement authorities in
the demanding state when the inmate's release date draws
near. "199
196. The first criminal removal statute, Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat.
195, did not specify the type of process to be used. Subsequently, Act of March 2,
1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, provided for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus cum
causa.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(0 (1970).
198. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S.REP. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4864, 4865.
199. Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a Nutshell, 7 CiEM. L. BULL.
753, 753 n.2 (1971) (emphasis added). More fully, Wexler and Hershey stated: "Upon
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A detainer, then, is nothing more than an informal notification
which does not compel or require any action by the authorities
with which it is lodged.2 00 Since such notification may be filed by
any law enforcement authority, including the police, empowered to
take an inmate into custody, a detainer may thus be issued without
judicial authorization or supervision. Indeed, as one federal court
of appeals has noted, detainers are "informal aides in interstate and
intrastate criminal administration."2 0 1 Detainers do not, however,
affect prosecution of the inmate. The detainer once filed remains
lodged against the inmate until further affirmative action is taken:
Prior to the Agreement, the detainer would have remained lodged
until the expiration of the imprisonment term, causing serious
damage to the inmate's quest for rehabilitation, parole, or other
institutional privilege. Under the Agreement, either the prosecuting authority requests custody of the detainee, or the detainee
himself requests transfer to the issuing jurisdiction for trial.
A federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, on the
other hand, is a "court order directing the production of a prisoner
to stand trial in federal court."202 The writ is time-honored judicial
process, commanding the appropriate authority to produce a state
prisoner in federal court promptly or by a specified date.20 3 By its
terms, the writ is executed immediately and cannot, like a detainer, lie dormant for an indefinite period, prejudicing the state
inmate's rehabilitation program. Upon return of the inmate to the
state prison, the writ is satisfied and the prisoner can reinvolve
himself in a rehabilitation program.
A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, therefore, is distinct from a detainer in a legal, historical, and functional sense.
The remaining question, then, is whether, notwithstanding these
differences, Congress intended to classify ad prosequendum writs
as detainers, thereby subjecting them to the Agreement's limitations.
Congressional enactment of the Agreement must be viewed
against the background of its failure to consider the effect of the
Agreement on the statute authorizing the writ of habeas corpus
notification, the demanding state will presumably have an ample opportunity to set
in motion its extradition machinery should it decide definitely to prosecute the prisoner at the expiration of his term." Id.

200.
201.
202.
203.

See Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1977).
Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1968).
Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 128-197 supra.
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ad prosequendum. This perspective is especially valid where, as

here, the extant legislation serves a distinct purpose, has a distinct function, and is separate from the subsequent statute, In such
a situation, an established rule of statutory construction provides

that where Congress has enacted express legislation concerning
a particular subject matter, that legislation should not be deemed
implicitly repealed by subsequent legislation which is not concerned with the same subject matter and which serves distinct purposes.20 4 Courts should try to reconcile an earlier statute with the
later one. 20 5 Repeal of an earlier statute by implication is not favored, because it is simple for Congress to state unequivocally that
prior legislation is repealed, if that is its intention. Only where there
is an irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, or when the latter
act, by its terms, is clearly intended to supersede the former statute,
is there repeal by implication. 20 6 Thus, the Agreement should be

construed to permit both the ad prosequendum writ and the detainer under the Agreement to have continued and independent
vitality. To do so will do no violence to the expressed purposes of
the Agreement.
The Agreement can be readily construed to apply to the
United States only as a sending state. 20 7 Although the language of
the Agreement includes the United States as a "state," so that the

federal government is thus within the definitions adopted by the
Agreement as both a "Sending State" and a "Receiving State,"
Congress evidently envisioned United States participation only as a
sending state. This congressional intent is illuminated by the

statement of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, subsequent to
enactment of the Agreement, in connection with clarifying legislation contained in the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of
1975,208 which provided in pertinent part:

204. Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 262 (1897). See also United
States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631 (1938).

205. See, e.g., McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459, 470-71 (1861).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 102 (1964).
207. See notes 35 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
208. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975).
S. 1 contained a provision which stated: "Adoption of Agreement by the United
States-The United States solely as a 'sending state,' and the District of Columbia
are parties to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ....
United States v. Mauro,
544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201(a), 121
CONG. REc. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975)), cert. granted,46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). While S. 1 was not enacted by the 94th Congress, legislation
now pending before the 95th Congress would make the United States a party to the
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Federal prosecution authorities and all Federal defendants have
always had and continue to have recourse to a speedy trial in a
Federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(5), the Federal writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The Committee does not
intend, nor does it believe that the Congress in enacting the
Agreement in 1970 intended, to limit the scope and applicability

of that writ.

20 9

This construction, according to Judge Weis, dissenting in United
States v. Sorrell,z1 ° would make "the statute workable and reasonable." 21 1 Judge Weis further noted, however, that this construction
2 12
"has been consistently rejected in the courts reviewing it."
Nevertheless, to construe the Agreement to include the federal
government only as a sending state would effectuate congressional
purpose and would not produce bizarre results, such as those in
United States v. Thompson.2 13 Moreover, the statement by Congress subsequent to enactment of the Agreement 2 14 should be
treated as virtually conclusive of the intended scope of the Agree215
ment.
Agreement "as a 'sending State' for purposes of Article III and IV, but as a 'receiving
State' for purposes of article III only." S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201 (1977);
H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3201 (1977).
209. S. REP. No. 00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1975), quoted in United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
210. 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also
in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
211. Id. at 235-36 (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977)).
212. Id. at 236 (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588
(2d Cir. 1976)), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596);
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, No.
76-6559.
213. 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977). In Thompson the prisoner was produced from
a state jail in Philadelphia to federal court in Philadelphia, and returned to jail the
same day. Although the state jail was also a contract facility for federal prisoners, see
18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1970), Thompson was returned and accepted by the state jail as a
state prisoner, because the United States had not arranged for his technical "paper"
transfer from state to federal custody. United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232, 234
(3d Cir. 1977). According to the Third Circuit, this return violated the Agreement,
and thus caused dismissal of the federal indictment. Id. at 234-35. Such dismissal is
as severe a sanction as most sanctions for constitutional violations. Thus, to characterize such a result as bizarre is an understatement.
214. See text accompanying notes 208 & 209 supra.
215. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
But see Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 13-14 (1950); National Bulk Carriers,
Inc. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 585, 593 (D. Del. 1963), where it was held that
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Soon after the Agreement's passage and just prior to its effective date, the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice, the
Agency responsible for federal prisoners, issued an important policy statement. 2 16 This statement indicates that the Agreement was
enacted to allow a state to take custody over federal and foreign
state prisoners2 17 since there has always been authority for the federal government to take custody over state inmates.
Further indication of congressional intent appears in the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974.218 Although this statute was enacted after
passage of the Agreement, an examination of its provisions demonstrates that Congress, in 1974, did not believe that the writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum was affected by the prior passage
of the Agreement. This Act, then, is further evidence of the original
congressional purpose to leave the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum unaffected by the Agreement.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 sets forth the duty of the federal
prosecutor: When such an official
knows that a person charged with an offense is serving a term of
imprisonment in any penal institution, he shall promptly(A) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for
trial; or
(B) cause a detainer to be filed with the person having custody of the prisoner and request him to so advise the prisoner and to advise the prisoner of his right to demand
2 19
trial.
This provision was adopted almost verbatim from section 3.1 of the
ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial recommended in 1967 by
the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial. 2 20 As the committee noted, this section was derived from the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers 2 21 and from the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
subsequent legislation could not supplement the intent of the original Congress
which enacted a particular statute. In the context of the Agreement, congressional

intent was always inferable: The United States was participating in the Agreement to
send prisoners to various states to avoid speedy trial dismissals and to enable federal
prisoners under state detainers to clear their outstanding detainers. Without the
Agreement, the detainer system adversely affected prisoners' rights with regard to
rehabilitation programs and the like.
216. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 2001.4 (Mar. 2, 1971).
217. Id.
218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975).
219. Id. § 3161(j)(1).
220. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 3.1.
221. See id. § 3.1(a), Commentary at 34.
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Detainers Act.2 22 The ABA provision, however, was broader in
scope and required the prosecutor to initiate procedures under
which the inmate could demand trial even though the prosecutor
223
did not seek immediate trial.
Significantly, Congress impliedly recognized the continued
viability of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum through its
only change from the proposed ABA provision and the enacted
legislation. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides:
When the person having custody of the prisoner receives
from the attorney for the Government a properly supported request for temporary custody of such prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that attorney for the Government
(subject, in cases of interjurisdictional transfer, to any right of
the prisoner to contest the legality of his delivery).22 4
The legislature omitted from the parenthetical proviso of this section language included in the ABA provision concerning "the traditional right of the executive to refuse transfer." 22 5 Thus, Congress
impliedly recognized the mandatory nature of the traditional writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum as used to obtain state prisoners:
Congress adopted the ABA proposal absent the provision concerning the right of the executive to refuse transfer, because the writ
22 6
was not susceptible to refusal by state officials.
Moreover, if the Agreement is applied to the United States as
a receiving state, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 would be simultaneously duplicative of, and inconsistent with, the Agreement. While
both the Act and the Agreement require the United States to
222. See id.
223. Interestingly, in the accompanying Commentary to § 3.1, there is no reference to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. However, this Commentary
refers to the Agreement and to 18 U.S.C. § 4085 (1964) (authority of Attorney General to transfer federal prisoner to state or to District of Columbia for proceedihgs
concerning state offense), see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 3.1(c), Commentary
at 36. Apparently, even the committee perceived no difficulty in federal prosecutors
obtaining state prisoners for trial or state prisoners obtaining a speedy federal trial.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
225. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 3.1(d). The full text of the ABA parenthetical proviso states: "subject, in cases of interjurisdictional transfer, to the traditional right of the executive to refuse transfer and the right of the prisoner to contest
the legality of his delivery." Id.
226. Although the legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 fails to
indicate the reason for this omission, it was stated that the production of defendant is
"without prejudice to traditional rights in cases of interjurisdictional transfer." H.R.
REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7401, 7415-16.
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guarantee a speedy trial, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 requires trial
to commence within sixty days of arraignment. 2 27 The Agreement,
however, provides for trial to be held within 180 days after the
prosecutor's receipt of the prisoner's demand 2 28 or within 120 days
after production of the prisoner in the requesting state on a
prosecutor-initiated request for custody.229 The Agreement also
lacks the detailed tolling provisions provided in the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974.230 Furthermore, the Act requires that a defendant be
arraigned within ten days after filing an indictment or information. 23 1 Congress expected this requirement to be complied with
"where the defendant's presence could have been obtained by the
exercise of prosecutorial initiative." 23 2 This requirement, however,
contravenes the Agreement, which requires a thirty-day delay during which the state executive can refuse to transfer the state prisoner to federal custody. 233 This latter refusal is, of course, inconsistent with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as well. Thus, as Judge
Weis noted in his Sorrell dissent, "there is a direct conflict between the Speedy Trial Act and the [Agreement] which the majority's interpretation [holding the writ to be a detainer] does not re23 4
solve but, in fact, creates."
Consequently, based on review of the history of the writ and
its legal and functional differences from the detainer, and based on
review of the legislative history of the Agreement together with
the subsequently enacted Speedy Trial Act of 1974, it appears that
the writ is not a detainer under the Agreement. Contrary to Mauro,
the United States is unable "to evade and circumvent the Agreement by simply utilizing the traditional writ." 235 This concern, as
stated by the First Circuit in United States v. Kenaan,2 3 6 "rests on
227. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (Supp. V 1975).
228. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538,
84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4475 (1970).
229. Id. art. IV(c), 18 U.S.C. app., at 4476.

§

2, art.

III(a),

230. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)-(i) (Supp. V 1975).
231. Id. § 3161(c).
232. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7401, 7424.
233. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, art. IV(a),
84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4476 (1970).
234. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Weis,

J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir.
1977)) (footnote omitted).
235. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
236. 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3158
(U.S. Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-206).
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a hypothetical."' 237 Since the writ is federal judicial process, the
issuing court -willbe able to prevent abuse.
Accordingly, the Agreement should be construed to provide
that the United States participates only as a sending state. Such a
construction would harmonize the Agreement, the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), and thereby give effect to
each according to the underlying congressional purpose of each.
Moreover, since the legislative history is silent concerning any expectation or understanding that the Agreement would impliedly repeal the writ, the Agreement should not be so construed, especially
when such a construction would contravene Congress' expressed
concerns in enacting the Agreement. The writ, therefore, should
continue to play its crucial role as a tool for jurisdictional potency as
well as administrative efficiency. To construe the writ as a detainer
would not necessarily advance the rehabilitative goals articulated by
Mauro238 but would unnecessarily disrupt the smoothly functioning
system of state-to-federal inmate transfer.
Is

AD PROSEQUENDUM
"REQUEST" UNDER THE AGREEMENT?

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A

In United States v. Ford 23 9 the majority held that regardless
of whether the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer
under the Agreement, it nevertheless constitutes a "written request for custody" under the Agreement. 240 In so holding, the
Second Circuit transformed the writ from enforceable federal court
process into a mere request for the production of a prisoner, which
is subject to the disapproval of the executive of the state where the
prisoner is incarcerated. As the following analysis indicates, this
holding is incorrect, and the federal ad prosequendum writ should
not be classified as a written request under article IV(a) of the
Agreement.
237. Id. at 917.
238. See United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). For a discussion of
these rehabilitative goals, see United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 236-37 (3d Cir.

1977) (Weis, J., dissenting) (dissenting also in United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d
232 (3d Cir. 1977)). Had defendant in Sorrell remained in federal custody, he would
have been lodged in a local jail where rehabilitation programs were not offered. In
contrast, had he been returned to his original place of confinement, there would
have been no interruption in his rehabilitation program, because the writ would have
been satisfied, thereby not disrupting his program. See id. at 228-29.
239. 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 77-52).
240. Id. at 736.
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Examination of the relevant legislative history reveals no evidence that either Congress or the drafters of the Agreement intended the Agreement to supplant or to modify the federal writ.
There is no reference to the writ in the Agreement's legislative history. Thus, as the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Scallion,24 1
had Congress intended to repeal the writ, it would be "incredible
that the Judiciary Committees of both the House and Senate would
fail to even mention" it. 24 2 Consequently, the writ should remain
independently viable and enforceable federal court process. Indeed, because of the mandatory nature of the writ, the federal government found it unnecessary to join the Agreement, absent concern with federal prisoners under state writs.
Nevertheless, the court in Ford reasoned that the provision
which authorizes states to refuse to comply with prosecutors' requests for temporary custody of prisoners, 2 43 "plays a very minor
role in the [Agreement's] general structure." 244 Thus, this provision did not constitute an impediment to subsuming the writ as a
"request" for purposes of effectuating the sanctions of the Agreement. Yet this characterization of the provision's role is debatable.
While the provision "relates to transfer mechanics," 24 5 it does
more: It preserves preexisting law concerning interstate transfers.
As the Council of State Governments indicated, the Governor's
disapproval authority is designed "to accommodate situations involving public policy which occasionally have been found in the
history of extradition.- 246 Thus, in the context of interstate transfers, this provision is not minor, but constitutes an essential ingredient of extradition law which did not apply to transfers of
prisoners from state to federal custody. These latter transfers are
probably enforceable under federal supremacy, when effected pur-

241. 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, No. 76-6559.
242. Id. at 1173.

243. Article IV(a) of the Agreement provides: "[T]here shall be a period of
thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request [for temporary custody of the prisoner] be honored, within which period the Governor of the
sending State may disapprove the request ... either upon his own motion or upon
motion of the prisoner." Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538,
§ 2, art. IV(a), 84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4476 (1970).
244. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
245. Id. at 742.
246. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION,
PROGRAM FOR 1957, at 79 (1956), reprinted in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, app.
B, at 47, 48.
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suant to the federal writ. 24 7 Indeed, it appears that the Ford result

might have been different had that court reached the question of
enforceability of the federal writ. In addition, there is no similar
executive right of disapproval with regard to prisoner-initiated
transfers. 248 The limitation on prosecutor-initiated transfers, then,
was maintained only for traditional prisoner exchanges and was not
extended to affect the newly-created right of the prisoner himself
to clear outstanding detainers. This suggests that the drafters of the
Agreement recognized the necessity for preserving the traditional
executive right to refuse extradition with respect to the historical
prosecutor demand, a practice that did not apply to federal demands for production of state prisoners.
This limitation on the procedure established to govern
prosecutor-initiated transfers, therefore, is sensible in the contexts
of interstate transfers or federal-to-state transfers. With respect to
the federal government, however, it is another matter to hold that
Congress intended to impose new conditions upon the federal government absent clear intent to do so. Moreover, there was no apparent reason to do so, because the United States obtained no discernible benefit from rejection of the time-honored method used to
obtain state prisoners for federal trial. Indeed, even the court in
Ford stated that this "argument might at first blush appear to have
some theoretical appeal,"2 49 but then rejected it. 2 50 The court in
Ford, however, based its conclusion on an exhaustive review of
materials that dealt with the general problem of detainers, rather
than on actual legislative history. Since Ford was not based on the
specific problems generated by federal detainers, it does not resolve whether Congress intended the federal writ to constitute a
request with its consequent limitations.
The limitation actually at issue in Ford provides: "In respect of
any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the
prisoner in the receiving State .... "251 This language also indi247. For a discussion of the enforceability of the federal writ pursuant to the
supremacy clause, see text accompanying notes 155-197 supra.
248. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. The legislative history does
not indicate why the right of the executive to disapprove prosecutor-initiated requests was preserved but not extended to the innovative concept of prisoner-initiated
requests.
249. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
250. Id. at 741.
251. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, art. IV(c),
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cates that the writ is not a request, since the proceeding in Ford,
trial in federal court, was not made possible by article IV. The ad
prosequendum writ is authorized independent of the Agreement.
This conclusion is inferable from the House and Senate Committee
on the Judiciary reports, which state: "The agreement also provides
a method whereby prosecuting authorities may secure prisoners
serving sentences in other jurisdictions for trial. "252 As the Fifth
Circuit stated: "Had there been an intent to make the Agreement
exclusive and to, thereby, impliedly repeal 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5),
the committees would hardly have used the word 'a' to describe
the method provided by the Agreement." 2 53 In addition, as discussed above, enactment of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 following
254
adoption of the Agreement supports this view.
Thus, Congress did not intend to equate the writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum with the "request" set forth in the
Agreement. To conclude otherwise would be to write into the
Agreement an unwarranted restriction on the ad prosequendum
writ.
CONCLUSION

The Agreement was first proposed in the 1950's because of
concern about the effect of outstanding state detainers on state defendants who were serving federal sentences in federal institutions.
Such prisoners suffered various disadvantages from the existence of
outstanding detainers that they were powerless to clear. Congress,
however, failed to enact the Agreement on the basis of this concern
alone. It was not until after the Supreme Court decided Smith v.
Hooey2 55 and Dickey v. Florida2 5 6 that the Agreement became federal law. Thus, Congress did not aim solely to ameliorate the disabilities suffered by federal prisoners against whom state detainers
were lodged. Rather, Congress' major objective was to prevent the
dismissal of charges because of the inability of state authorities
84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475, 4476 (1970) (emphasis

added).
252. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4864, 4865
(emphasis added).
253. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnote
omitted), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 76-6559.
254. See notes 218-234 supra and accompanying text.
255. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
256. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
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routinely to obtain federal prisoners for state trials. At no time,
however, did Congress express concern for the converse situation:
state prisoners who were also federal defendants.
The reason for the lack of congressional interest in this latter
situation is clear, although unexpressed: There was no equivalent
problem and thus no corresponding need for legislation regarding
state prisoners who were also federal defendants. This conclusion is
buttressed by the established power of the federal government to
use the traditional federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
To hold that this time-honored writ, not even discussed in the
Agreement's legislative history, was repealed or modified by the
Agreement would be bizarre, especially given that the sanction for
violation of the Agreement is at least as stringent as that provided
for constitutional violations. Certainly, as has been said in a different but related context: "[t]he policy behind the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is no stronger than the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy." 2 57 It is unreasonable, therefore, to hold
that the ad prosequendum writ constitutes a detainer under the
Agreement. Likewise, the writ does not constitute a written request under the Agreement, for to equate the two would cause an
unwarranted and unintended modification of the writ. If Congress
had intended that result, it would have known how to do so explicitly. Thus, it seems inconceivable that Congress contemplated
the construction of the Agreement given by United States v.
26 0
Mauro,258 United States v. Ford,2 59 or United States v. Sorrell.
Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes
neither a detainer nor a written request under the Agreement.

257. United States v. Cumberbatch, 563 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1977).
258. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977) (No. 76-1596).
259. 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 4,

1977) (No. 77-52).
260.

562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977) (en bane).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 1

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/1

40

